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BEYOND TORTURE: THE NEMO TENETUR
PRINCIPLE IN BORDERLINE CASES
Luis E. Chiesa*
Abstract: The Latin phrase nemo tenetur seipsum accusare means roughly “no
man has to accuse himself.” It is the basis of our rights against selfincrimination and forced inculpation. It protects against three practical
problems associated with confessions: (1) untrustworthy confessions; (2)
involuntary confessions; and (3) confessions provoked through unacceptable force. This article argues that the Nemo tenetur principle was intended
primarily to avoid the third problem: confessions obtained through improper methods. It examines the arguments for and against justifying the
principle as a protection against either untrustworthy or involuntary confessions. The article also develops a framework to aid in the identification
of improper methods of interrogation. Finally, it concludes by applying
this framework to three hypothetical cases and arguing that only confessions obtained through unacceptable force should be barred.

Introduction—Three Borderline Cases
The maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare (the “Nemo tenetur principle”) comes from Latin and is usually translated as “no one need accuse
himself.”1 In the United States, this principle is often identified with
the right against self-incrimination.2 In civil law countries, the Nemo
tenetur principle guarantees at least five rights of the defendant in a
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. This article draws upon
and further elaborates on the ideas first espoused in a lecture delivered at an international
criminal procedure conference held in Mexico City in October 2008.
1 See also Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable
Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 465, 479 (2005) (tracing the
development of the Nemo tenetur principle from the use of “imprisonment, exile, and
physical torture to punish silence and to provoke suspects to confess to heresy and other
crimes”). See generally Claus Roxin, La Evolución de la Política Criminal, el Derecho
Penal y el Proceso Penal 123–38 (Tirant Lo Blanch ed., Gómez Rivero & García Cantizano trans., 2000) (author trans.).
2 See Roxin, supra note 1, at 123–38; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442–43
(1965) (quoting Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596–97 (1896)) (discussing the origin of
the Nemo tenetur principle and how it became part of fundamental constitutional law); Godsey, supra note 1, at 480 (noting that “the doctrine of Nemo tenetur and its abhorrence of the
government use of torture and coercive interrogation techniques drove the selfincrimination clause’s ultimate inclusion in the Bill of Rights”).
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criminal trial: (1) the right to remain silent; (2) the right not to be
called to testify; (3) the right to speak to an attorney before incriminating oneself; (4) the right not to be coerced into inculpating oneself;
and (5) the right not to incriminate oneself in a judicial proceeding.3
The main evil the Nemo tenetur principle seeks to avoid is the official use of torture as a means for obtaining incriminating testimony.4
The rationale behind excluding self-incriminating statements obtained
through the use of torture can be explained in three different ways.
First, confessions obtained by force or violence may not be trustworthy,
because a suspect ordinarily would be willing to say anything to stop
such mistreatment.5 Second, using torture to obtain incriminating
statements violates a suspect’s autonomy and undermines the volun3 See Roxin, supra note 1, at 123–38. Although the United States Constitution protects
the same rights, not all derive from the Fifth Amendment’s protection against selfincrimination. See U.S. Const. amend. V; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471–74 (holding that
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination affords suspects in custodial interrogation the right to counsel); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206–07 (1964)
(holding that the government may not deliberately elicit incriminating statements from a
suspect after initiation of criminal proceedings against him unless the suspect’s attorney is
present). For example, the right not to be coerced into incriminating oneself derives from
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses. See U.S. Const. amends. V,
XIV. Additionally, the right to speak to an attorney before incriminating oneself comes
partly from the protection against self-incrimination and partly from a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to be assisted by counsel. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471–74 (holding that
the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination affords suspects in custodial
interrogation the right to counsel); Massiah, 377 U.S. at 205–07 (holding that the government may not deliberately elicit incriminating statements from a suspect after initiation of
criminal proceedings against him unless the suspect’s attorney is present).
Therefore, strictly speaking, the right against self-incrimination does not have the
same scope in civil law countries and in the United States. See Kai Ambos, The Right of NonSelf-Incrimination of Witnesses Before the ICC, 15 Leiden J. Int’l L. 155, 166 (2002). This article uses the term Nemo tenetur to include all five rights, which is broader than it is generally
used in the United States. See id. at 159–62. Ultimately, what matters is that, regardless of
their source, the guarantees derived from the Nemo tenetur principle are legally binding
both in the United States and continental Europe. See Godsey, supra note 1, at 479–81;
Ambos, supra, at 166.
4 See Godsey, supra note 1, at 479–81.
5 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1966) (“The privilege against self-incrimination is, of
course, related to the question of the safeguards necessary to assure that admissions or
confessions are reasonably trustworthy, that they are not the mere fruits of fear or coercion, but are reliable expressions of the truth.”). Early cases addressing the admissibility of
confessions in state criminal trials required exclusion of such confessions primarily (and
perhaps exclusively) because of their unreliability, but as the course of adjudication proceeded, it became clear that confessions would be held “involuntary” and hence inadmissible, even when their reliability was clearly established. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278, 285–87 (1936). Indeed, in 1961, in Rogers v. Richmond, the Supreme Court held
that a court assessing a voluntariness claim could not even consider the fact that the police
tactics would not tend to produce a false confession. 365 U.S. 534, 543–44 (1961).
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tariness of the confession.6 Third, it is inappropriate for the government to use torture as an interrogation technique.7 If torture is used to
extract a confession, the trustworthiness of the confession is doubtful,
the involuntariness of the confession is obvious, and the appropriateness of the officers’ conduct is questionable. If all three justifications
for excluding a confession are present, then the confession will likely
not be admitted into evidence. If, however, the confession is either
trustworthy, voluntary, or obtained without resorting to inappropriate
conduct, the inadmissibility of such confession is less clear. Consider
the following three examples:
The False Confession Case. John goes to the police and confesses
to having committed murder. The evidence gathered by the
police overwhelmingly suggests that John falsely confessed
in order to protect Joseph, his son and chief suspect of the
crime.
The Truth Serum Case. Luke dissolves several pills of Amytal, a
truth serum, into Peter’s drink. Peter, unaware that it contains the substance, takes the drink. A couple of hours later,
Peter is lawfully arrested and interrogated by the police
about his possible participation in a robbery. Peter, who had
participated in the robbery, confesses to his role. The police
do not know and have no reason to suspect Peter is under
the influence of Amytal. Later investigation reveals independent evidence which fully confirms Peter’s confession.
The Unnecessary Threat Case. Maria is arrested and interrogated
by the police. Just as Maria begins to confess, a police officer interrupts her, threatening to beat her up if she does
not incriminate herself. Maria then makes several inculpa6 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433–34 (2000) (summarizing the role of
the voluntariness test in confession jurisprudence through the past century); Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285–86 (1991); 2 Edward J. Imwinkelried et al., Courtroom
Criminal Evidence § 2303 (3d ed. 1998) (“To successfully offer an admission or confession into evidence, the prosecutor must comply with . . . the voluntariness doctrine . . . .
The voluntariness doctrine requires that admissions and confessions be shown to have
been made voluntarily.”); Wayne R. Lafave et al., Criminal Procedure § 6.2(b) (3d ed.
2000) (“This due process test is customarily referred to as the ‘voluntariness’ requirement,
the term used by the Court in enunciating the due process requisites for admissibility.”).
7 See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 843 n.33 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The great advantage of police compliance with the law is that it helps to create
an atmosphere conducive to community respect for officers of the law that in turn serves
to promote their enforcement of the law.”) (quoting Roger J. Traynor, Lawbreakers, Courts,
and Law-Abiders, 41 J. St. B. Cal. 458, 478 (1966)).
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tory statements. Other evidence introduced by the state at
trial corroborates these statements. At her trial, Maria’s
counsel makes a motion to suppress the confession. During
the hearing on that motion, Maria testifies that the police
officer’s threat did not influence her decision to confess.
In the first example, the false confession case, the main reason to exclude the incriminating statements is that there are good reasons to
believe that they might be false.8 John’s decision to confess, however,
was completely voluntary. Moreover, the police did not use any inappropriate interrogation techniques to extract the confession.
The second example, the truth serum case, presents a different
problem. Peter’s confession was independently corroborated by the
officers. As such, it cannot be excluded on the grounds that it lacks
probative value.9 Furthermore, because the officers were unaware that
Peter had taken Amytal, they could not have intentionally taken advantage of its effects. Consequently, the confession cannot be excluded on
the grounds that the officers used inappropriate interrogation methods. The most powerful argument to exclude this confession is that it
was involuntary, since the truth serum substantially diminished Peter’s
ability to freely choose whether or not to confess.
Finally, in the third example, the unnecessary threat case, the confession can be challenged because of the inappropriate methods used in
interrogation. In that example, the confession is clearly trustworthy.
Moreover, Maria’s testimony during the suppression hearing reveals
that the officers’ threat did not influence her decision to confess and
8 See Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411, 413 (1942) (holding that “conviction through the
use of perjured testimony . . . violates civilized standards for the trial of guilt or innocence
and thereby deprives an accused of liberty without due process of law”) (citation omitted);
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1935) (holding that the use by a state of testimony known by its “prosecuting authorities” to be false is a denial of due process of law).
But see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (explaining that courts should not
have to “divine a defendant’s motion for speaking or acting as he did even though there
be no claim that governmental conduct coerced his decision”); Lisenba v. California, 314
U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (“The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence,
whether true or false.”). See generally Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution:
Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 105, 121–35 (1997)
(giving examples of potentially false confessions and analyzing the interrogation strategies
in certain cases).
9 See Hysler, 315 U.S. at 420–22; Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112; see also White, supra note 8, at
111 (“Interrogation methods likely to lead to untrustworthy confessions should be prohibited, and safeguards designed to reduce the likelihood that false confessions will be admitted . . . should be adopted.”).

2010]

Beyond Torture: The Nemo Tenetur Principle in Borderline Cases

39

therefore that her confession was entirely voluntary. As a result, the best
argument in favor of suppressing this confession is that the police used
an inappropriate method of interrogation.10
Whether the confessions in these three examples violate the Nemo
tenetur principle depends on whether the main purpose of this safeguard is: (1) to exclude untrustworthy evidence; (2) to protect the suspect’s autonomy; or (3) to prohibit the use of inappropriate methods
of interrogation.11 This Article argues that the main justification of the
Nemo tenetur principle is as a protection against the use of improper
methods of investigation. Under this interpretation, the confessions in
the false confession case and the truth serum case do not violate the Nemo
tenetur principle.12 In contrast, under this interpretation, the confession
in the unnecessary threat case did violate this principle because although
the statement in that example was trustworthy and voluntary, the
methods of interrogation used by the officers were inappropriate. The
argument will be developed in three parts.
Part I of the article argues that the Nemo tenetur principle should
not be justified solely as a protection against the admission of untrustworthy confessions. First, it examines the counterarguments in favor of
justifying the principle primarily as a protection against untrustworthy
confessions. Second, it discusses Spano v. New York in which the Supreme
Court suggested the Nemo tenetur principle should not be justified alone
on the trustworthiness or untrustworthiness of a confession.13 As such,
this part concludes that there is no necessary connection between a
confession’s trustworthiness and its admissibility and therefore that the

10 See infra Part III, for a discussion of what constitutes an inappropriate method of interrogation. See also Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 38 (1967) (suggesting threats of
force were inappropriate); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958) (suggesting promises of protection from force were inappropriate); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143,
158–59 (1944) (holding that thirty-six hours of continuous interrogation is “inherently
coercive”); Brown, 297 U.S. at 285–87 (suggesting confessions induced by force were inappropriate).
11 See 3 John Henry Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 824 (1st ed. 1904); Godsey,
supra note 1, at 479–81; George C. Thomas III, Regulating Police Deception During Interrogation, 39 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1293, 1296–99 (2007); White, supra note 8, at 111–12 (describing the evolution of untrustworthy and involuntary justifications in Nemo tenetur analysis).
12 This does not mean that there are no arguments in favor of excluding these confessions. In the false confession case, for example, one could justify excluding the confession
not because it was obtained in violation of the Nemo tenetur principle, but because it is false.
See Hysler, 315 U.S. at 413; Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112; see also White, supra note 8, at 156 (concluding that interrogation methods leading to false confessions violate due process).
13 See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959).
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Nemo tenetur principle should not be justified primarily as a protection
against untrustworthy statements.14
Part II advances three arguments against using the voluntariness of
the confession as the standard to determine whether it has been obtained in violation of the Nemo tenetur principle. The first part argues
that most, if not all, legal systems sanction methods of interrogation
which call into question the voluntariness of a suspect’s confession. The
second part argues that the involuntariness of a confession is determined almost entirely by normative criteria, based on society’s legitimate expectations of moral strength.15 The third part discusses recent
developments in neuroscience suggesting that human behavior is most
likely determined almost entirely by factors outside an individual’s control. It then asserts that if these findings were true, every human act
would be considered involuntary. Consequently, examining the “voluntariness” of a statement would be a pointless endeavor.
Part III argues that the main purpose of the Nemo tenetur principle
is to curb inappropriate police conduct. It contends that the appropriateness of the interrogation methods used by the state should be evaluated before looking to the statement’s trustworthiness or the suspect’s
freedom of choice at the time of the confession. From this conclusion,
14 See Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1954). For example, uncorroborated confessions are typically unreliable, although they might have been obtained by
methods that are perfectly compatible with the Nemo tenetur principle. See id. Conversely,
many confessions obtained by torture are later corroborated and are, therefore, reliable. It
would be a mistake, however, to conclude that because a confession obtained by physical
coercion was trustworthy, it did not violate the Nemo tenetur principle.
It is important to distinguish between the admissibility of an uncorroborated confession and the sufficiency of an uncorroborated confession necessary to establish a conviction. Compare Smith, 348 U.S. at 152–53, and Warszower v. United States, 312 U.S. 342, 345–
47 (1941), with Ray v. State, 615 S.E.2d 812, 817 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining that when
evaluating sufficiency of a conviction, a court does not weigh the evidence or credibility),
and Commonwealth v. Kimball, 73 N.E.2d 468, 470 (Mass. 1947) (“The trend . . . is in the
direction of eliminating quantitative tests of sufficiency of evidence.”). Although most
jurisdictions allow uncorroborated confessions to be admitted into evidence, a majority
hold that that a defendant’s uncorroborated incriminating statements are not sufficient
evidence to sustain a conviction. See, e.g., Smith, 348 U.S. at 156; Warszower, 312 U.S. at 347–
48. A minority of jurisdictions, however, allow the state to secure a conviction solely on the
basis of an uncorroborated statement. See, e.g., Ray, 615 S.E.2d at 816–17; Kimball, 73
N.E.2d at 470. The Supreme Court in Smith stated that the purpose of requiring corroborating evidence is to “prevent ‘errors in convictions based upon untrue confessions’” and
to exclude statements that although “not . . . involuntary within the meaning of [the due
process protections against coerced confessions],” are of suspect reliability. Smith, 348 U.S.
at 153 (quoting Warszower, 312 U.S. at 347).
15 See Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its
Proper Limits, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1331, 1334 (1989).
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it reasons that the question of whether an interrogation violates the
Nemo tenetur principle is above all a normative one. In other words, the
relevant question is whether the confession was obtained by interrogation techniques that are incompatible with the fundamental values that
inform the United States’ system of justice.
Part III also develops a framework to assist in the identification of
interrogation methods which violate the rights guaranteed by the Nemo
tenetur principle. The four categories of improper methods included in
this theoretical framework are: (1) exploitation of a suspect by the police;
(2) physical or psychological coercion of a suspect; (3) certain kinds of
deception; and (4) the transgression of a mutually agreed upon rule to obtain an unfair advantage over a suspect.16 Finally, the article concludes
by applying this framework to the three hypothetical cases outlined
above and argues that only the confession obtained through improper
methods should be barred.
I. The Nemo Tenetur Principle and the Confession’s
Trustworthiness
The Nemo tenetur principle should not be justified primarily as a
protection against the admission of untrustworthy confessions.17 An examination in favor of this approach reveals the danger in making the
inadmissibility of a confession hinge on its trustworthiness.18 Were the
principle justified primarily as a protection against untrustworthy statements, then the admissibility of a confession would depend primarily on
its trustworthiness.19 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has said
that the right against self-incrimination, derived from the Nemo tenetur
principle, cannot be justified solely as a protection against the admission

16 The clearest cases of exploitation occur when the police deliberately place the suspect
in a condition of defenselessness or ignorance with the purpose of taking advantage of
him. See Stuart P. Green, Lying, Cheating, and Stealing 95 (2006). The paradigmatic
example of physical coercion employed against the suspect is torture. See id. at 93–95. It is
unclear whether the use of all types of deception should be considered incompatible with
the Nemo tenetur principle. See id. at 95; see also infra Part III. It may be worth distinguishing,
for example, between lying to obtain a confession and misleading the suspect into confessing. See Green, supra, at 95; see also infra Part III. A case of transgression takes place when the
police obtain a confession from a defendant without allowing him to speak with his attorney or when the defendant gives up his right to legal representation after the criminal
proceedings have begun. See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206–07; see also infra Part III.
17 See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320–21 (1950).
18 See id.
19 See id.
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of untrustworthy confessions.20 As such, for a confession to be deemed
inadmissible, it need not be deemed untrustworthy.21
A. The Emergence of Trustworthiness as a Yardstick for Determining the
Admissibility of a Confession
One of the earliest cases in which a U.S. court held a confession
inadmissible because it had been obtained by torture was Hector v. State,
which the Missouri Supreme Court decided in 1829.22 In that case, the
defendant, a slave, had been arrested for burglary.23 He was interrogated and beaten “all night.”24 During the course of this beating, Hector
confessed to the burglary and said that if the police “would release him
he would find the [missing] money.”25 When he was released, however,
he was not able to locate it.26 At trial, Hector’s counsel moved to suppress the confession and other statements made during the interrogation.27 The trial court denied the motion and admitted the statements
as evidence.28
In its opinion reversing the trial court, the Missouri Supreme Court
expressed serious doubts about the confession’s trustworthiness.29 It
noted that Hector had probably confessed “to gain a respite from
pain.”30 The court also noted that the confession had not been corroborated by other evidence.31 It is unclear, however, whether the court would
still have excluded the confession if Hector had been able to locate the
money.32 This opinion highlights the link between the confession’s untrustworthiness and its inadmissibility by emphasizing that Hector’s confession was not reliable and was “most probably” made solely to stop the
beating.33 Nevertheless, it also shows the danger of making the admissi20 See id.
21 See id.
22 See Hector v. State, 2 Mo. 166, 168 (1829).
23 See id. at 167.
24 See id.
25 See id.
26 See id.
27 See Hector, 2 Mo. at 167.
28 See id.
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 See id. (noting the confession’s untrustworthiness “was strengthened by the fact that
no money was found where the party and prisoner went to look for it”).
32 See Hector, 2 Mo. at 168.
33 See id. Similarly, in Brown v. Mississippi, the defendant, who had already been arrested and tortured once, was arrested a few days later and again “severely whipped.” 297
U.S. 278, 281–82 (1936). The deputy told the defendant that “he would continue the
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bility of a confession obtained by improper interrogation techniques
hinge on its trustworthiness.34 For example, if Hector had guessed the
location of the money correctly or if his interrogators had suggested the
correct location, the court may have found his confession trustworthy
and admitted it even though it was obtained through inappropriate
methods.
Today, about 180 years after Hector, the debate continues over
whether a confession’s admissibility should be determined based on its
trustworthiness.35 In the United States, for example, many have argued
that terrorists should not be tortured because the information obtained
is unreliable.36 This argument was recently invoked by Senator John
McCain, who pointed out that “in [his] experience, abuse of prisoners
often produces bad intelligence because under torture a person will say
anything he thinks his captors want to hear.”37 The similarities between
McCain’s statements and the ones proffered by the court in Hector are
striking and illustrate that the trustworthiness of the information obtained by torture is still a tempting way to determine the admissibility of
a confession.38
Excluding confessions primarily on “reliability” grounds is problematic because the state could devise methods of torture which produce trustworthy statements.39 Were the Nemo tenetur principle justified
whipping until he confessed.” Id. At that time, the defendant “agreed to confess to such a
statement as the deputy would dictate.” Id.
34 See Hector, 2 Mo. at 167–68.
35 See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 377 (1964) (holding that “a defendant in a
criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his or her conviction is founded, in whole
or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of the
confession”) (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 543–44 (1961)); see also Gisli H.
Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations, Confessions, and Testimony 228
(2003) (discussing voluntary false confessions); George E. Dix, Federal Constitutional Confession Law: The 1986 and 1987 Supreme Court Terms, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 231, 273–76 (1988) (discussing various reliability arguments); White, supra note 8, at 117 (discussing why some
find reliability concerns no longer relevant).
36 See, e.g., John McCain, Torture’s Terrible Toll, Newsweek, Nov. 21, 2005, at 34.
37 See id.
38 See Wigmore, supra note 11, § 824. As early as 1904, Wigmore suggested that the test
for determining the admissibility of confessions obtained as a result of questionable police
tactics should be whether the police conduct was “such that there was any fair risk of a false
confession.” Id. Wigmore’s test asks whether the interrogation employed by the police was
of such a nature that it created a fair risk of a false confession regardless of whether it is
proven that the content of the confession was true. Id. Some scholars still defend reliability
tests for determining the admissibility of a confession similar to the one advocated by
Wigmore more than a century ago. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 11, at 1294–95.
39 See Thomas, supra note 11, at 1293–96. A recent report suggests that torture might
lead to reliable information. See Scott Shane, Inside a 9/11 Mastermind’s Interrogation, N.Y.
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primarily as a protection against untrustworthy statements, then the
admissibility of a confession would depend primarily on its trustworthiness. The danger of this “reliability” argument, therefore, is that it opens
the door to the legalization of torture if the information obtained is
trustworthy.40 To remain respectful of human dignity, it would seem that
such statements should not be admitted into evidence regardless of
their reliability.
Therefore, the primary justification of this principle should not be
that it is a safeguard against untrustworthy statements.41 Although untrustworthy statements will sometimes be barred by the Nemo tenetur principle, the primary justification should be broader so as to exclude statements obtained through improper methods of interrogation in spite of
their trustworthiness.42
B. The Limits of Trustworthiness in the Confession Context
The United States Supreme Court has said that the right against
self-incrimination—which derives from the Nemo tenetur principle—
should not be justified primarily as a protection against untrustworthy
confessions.43 In Spano v. New York, the Supreme Court examined the
link between a statement’s trustworthiness and its admissibility under
the Due Process Clause guarantee against coerced confessions.44 In that
case, the issue was the admissibility of a confession obtained after interrogating the suspect from approximately 7:00 p.m. until 4:00 a.m.45 The
evidence presented at trial revealed no serious doubts about the truthTimes, June 22, 2008, at A1 (explaining how after being tortured, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed became “quite compliant” and produced useful intelligence). But see Mark Bowden,
The Ploy, Atlantic, May 2007, at 54 (describing how interrogators, without torture, were
able to produce reliable intelligence from people from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s inner circle that led to his eventual killing). Wigmore’s “reliability” tests would not bar the admissibility of incriminating statements obtained through torture as long as the government
could prove that method of torture predictably and reliably produced useful intelligence.
See Wigmore, supra note 11, § 824.
40 See Wigmore, supra note 11, § 824; Charles T. McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 Tex. L. Rev. 239, 245 (1946) (“[T]he predominate motive of the courts has been that of protecting the citizen against violation of his
privileges of immunity from bodily manhandling by the police, and from other undue
pressures . . . of the ‘third degree.’”); Thomas, supra note 11, at 1293–94; White, supra note
8, at 138.
41 See Wigmore, supra note 11, § 824; McCormick, supra note 40, at 245; White, supra
note 8, at 138.
42 See infra Part III for further discussion.
43 See Spano, 360 U.S. at 320–21; Godsey, supra note 1, at 480.
44 See Spano, 360 U.S. at 320–21.
45 See id. at 317, 319, 322.
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fulness of the confession and, consequently, the guilt of the defendant.46
Rather, the Court ruled that the confession was inadmissible because it
had been obtained in violation of the suspect’s right to not be coerced
into self-incrimination.47 The Supreme Court did not ground its exclusion of the confession in the confession’s trustworthiness. Chief Justice
Warren justified the Court’s holding by pointing out that:
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police
must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life
and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods
used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.48
This opinion suggests that justifying the exclusion of a statement
obtained by improper interrogation techniques solely on the grounds
that the statement is not trustworthy may inadvertently justify the admission of truthful statements obtained through torture. For example,
in Spano, independent evidence showed the confession was most likely
truthful.49 Therefore, if the statement’s admissibility was determined
mainly by its trustworthiness, the confession obtained after eight
straight hours of interrogation may have been admitted.50
The Court, however, largely ignored the reliability of the confession.51 Instead, it focused on factors that had little to do with the confession’s trustworthiness.52 For example, it noted that the suspect was a
poorly educated foreigner with a history of emotional instability.53 It
also noted that one police officer who participated in the interrogation
was a good friend of the suspect.54 This officer told the suspect that the
officer would lose his job if the suspect refused to confess.55
This decision illustrates how even a trustworthy confession may still
violate the Nemo tenetur principle.56 Indeed, the Supreme Court, since
46 See id at 324.
47 See id. at 320–21, 324.
48 Id. at 320–21.
49 See Spano, 360 U.S. at 324.
50 See id.
51 See id. at 320–21, 324.
52 See id. at 320–21.
53 Id. at 321–22.
54 Spano, 360 U.S. at 323.
55 Id. The Court also based its holding on the interrogation’s duration. See id.
56 See id. at 320–21; see also White, supra note 8, at 112–13.
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Spano, has explicitly stated that some confessions are inadmissible even
if they are trustworthy, because “certain interrogation techniques . . . are
so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”57 Moreover, the Court has stated that “the aim [of the right against selfincrimination] is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to
prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or
false.”58
II. The Nemo Tenetur Principle and the Voluntariness
of the Confession
It has been suggested that the Nemo tenetur principle protects
against “involuntary” confessions.59 This view is grounded on the notion that the right to be free from coercive interrogation stems from
respect for the suspect’s autonomy.60 This justification of the Nemo tenetur principle has been influential both in civil law and common law
countries.61 In Spain, for example, it has been stated that the exercise
of the right against self-incrimination, which derives from the Nemo tenetur principle, seeks to ensure “the . . . freedom and spontaneity” of the
suspect.62 Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has pointed out
that the right against self-incrimination is intended to protect the
“mental freedom” of the subject.63
57 See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985) (reviewing whether voluntariness of a
confession is an issue of fact).
58 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (quoting Lisbena v. California, 314
U.S. 219, 290 (1941) (holding that there must be coercive police activity to determine a
confession involuntary under the Due Process Clause)).
59 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433–34 (2000) (summarizing the
role of the voluntariness test in confession jurisprudence through the past century); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285–86 (1991) (“[A] ‘determination regarding the voluntariness of a confession . . . must be viewed in a totality of the circumstances.’”) (quoting
State v. Fulminante, 778 P.2d 602, 608 (Ariz. 1988)); Imwinkelried et al., supra note 6,
§ 2303 (“To successfully offer an admission or confession into evidence, the prosecutor
must comply with [the voluntariness doctrine] . . . . The voluntariness doctrine requires
that admissions and confessions be shown to have been made voluntarily.”); Lafave et al.,
supra note 6, § 6.2(b) (“This due process test is customarily referred to as the ‘voluntariness’ requirement, the term used by the Court in enunciating the due process requisites
for admissibility.”).
60 See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 285–88.
61 See id.; Alberto Montón Redondo et al., Derecho Jurisdiccional III Proceso
Penal 199 (Bosch 1995) (author trans.).
62 See Redondo, supra note 61, at 199.
63 Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 602 (1944) (examining why coercion of a confession violates principles of liberty and justice).
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At first glance, justifying the Nemo tenetur principle as a protection
of a suspect’s autonomy does not seem objectionable. After all, the
Fifth Amendment bars the government from compelling individuals to
incriminate themselves.64 In fact, justifying the principle as a protection
of the suspect’s freedom is more defensible than justifying it as a protection against untrustworthy confessions. Nevertheless the voluntary
or involuntary nature of the statement should not be the primary factor in determining whether it was obtained in violation of the Nemo tenetur principle.65
Conceiving the Nemo tenetur principle as a vehicle for guaranteeing
voluntary confessions presents three different problems. First, suspects
in almost every legal system can be lawfully compelled to confess in a
way that may diminish the voluntariness of the confession. Second, the
definition of voluntariness depends on normative criteria. Third, recent
scientific research has challenged whether any act is voluntary. As a result, the Nemo tenetur principle should not be justified primarily as protection of a suspect’s autonomy.
A. Voluntariness in Domestic and Comparative Perspectives: The Problem of
Immunity, Efficient Collaboration, and Punishment Mitigation
in Exchange for a Confession
The first reason voluntariness should not be considered the primary justification of the Nemo tenetur principle is because suspects in almost every legal system can be compelled to confess in a way that calls
into question the voluntariness of the confession. For example, for over
110 years, the Supreme Court has recognized that a suspect who receives immunity can be held in contempt for refusing to testify against
himself.66 The justification for this practice is that a grant of immunity
64 See U.S. Const. amend. V.
65 See Yale Kamisar, What Is an “Involuntary” Confession?, in Police Interrogation
and Confessions: Essays in Law and Policy 25 (1980) (suggesting that courts should
“scrap the ‘voluntariness’ terminology altogether”); Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free
Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 Va. L. Rev. 859, 863 (1979) (documenting the “intolerable uncertainty . . . of the due process voluntariness doctrine”); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Confessions and the Court, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 865, 869–72 (1981) (reviewing Kamisar, supra)
(discussing the defects in the due process involuntary confession rule); George C. Thomas
III & Marshall D. Bilder, Aristotle’s Paradox and the Self-Incrimination Puzzle, 82 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 243, 245 n.14 (1991) (citing numerous sources that discuss the problems
with the involuntary confession rule).
66 See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 609–10 (1896) (holding that a witness with immunity was required to testify regarding his knowledge of an alleged offense and could not
refuse on the grounds that doing so would result in self-incrimination); see also Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). In Kastigar, the Supreme Court decided that a
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leaves a suspect in the same position as if he had invoked his right
against self-incrimination because his statements cannot be used against
him in a criminal proceeding.67
A statement made under threat of conviction for contempt, however, is not entirely voluntary.68 Consequently, the Fifth Amendment
protection against self-incrimination cannot be dependent on the suspect’s freedom or spontaneity. If it were, then this practice of offering
immunity in exchange for testimony would violate that right.69
The Rome Statute—ratified by the majority of countries in the
world—also allows the use of immunity as a tool to compel a witness to
testify.70 Yet, compelling a suspect to testify by giving him immunity is
often frowned upon in civil law countries.71 Nevertheless, many countries allow the prosecution to offer a reduction in punishment for a suspect’s “efficient collaboration” with governmental authorities.72 In these
cases, the government does not entirely compel self-incrimination.73 A
person can be forced to testify if the State guarantees it will not use the self-incriminating
statements or any evidence derived from those statements in a prosecution against the
declarant. See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453. This type of immunity is known as “immunity from
use.” See Ambos, supra note 3, at 164. Another type of immunity is “transactional immunity,” which is immunity from criminal liability for any transaction, matter, or thing discussed in compelled testimony. See id. “Immunity from use” grants less protection than
“transactional immunity,” because it may allow the use of incriminating statements in a
prosecution if there is independent incriminating evidence that is untainted by the suspect’s compelled statements. See id.
67 See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453; Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 436 (1956)
(holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination only protects a
witness from being compelled to give testimony that would result in criminal prosecution
and therefore could not be invoked where the Immunity Act had removed the threat of
prosecution for actions revealed by the compelled testimony).
68 See Ambos, supra note 3, at 172–74.
69 See generally Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453.
70 See International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 74, Sept. 10,
2002, ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part II-A). Despite the fact that the international community endorsed this rule, Professor Kai Ambos has suggested that granting immunity as a means to
force a witness to testify is incompatible with the Nemo tenetur principle. See Ambos, supra
note 3, at 172–77. Rule 74(3) conflicts with the Nemo tenetur principle only if the principle
is justified primarily as a protection against the admission of involuntary statements. See id.
at 177. However, the Nemo tenetur principle should not be considered a means to ensure a
voluntary confession. Rather, it should be conceived as a right to prevent the state from
obtaining a confession by using inappropriate or abusive interrogation methods. See infra
Part III.
71 See Ambos, supra note 3, at 166; Quispe Farfán & Fany Soledad, Derecho a la No Incriminación y su Aplicación en el Perú § 3.6, (2002) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos) (author trans.).
72 See Farfán & Soledad, supra note 71, § 3.6. Colombia and Peru, among others, allow
granting benefits in exchange for efficient collaboration. Id.
73 Id.
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reduction in punishment, however, may increase the likelihood that the
suspect will “waive” the rights afforded by the Nemo tenetur principle,
thereby lessening the voluntariness of his confession.74
Not all civil law countries regulate the legal effect of efficient collaboration.75 Most allow, however, a considerable mitigation of punishment where the suspect gives a “truthful confession” of his participation
in the crime.76 Just like statements obtained in exchange for efficient
collaboration, it is unclear whether a decision to confess which was induced by a promise of less severe punishment is really “voluntary” and
spontaneous. Nevertheless, courts in civil law jurisdictions often allow
this practice.77 Indeed, Spain’s Constitutional Court has even asserted
that this practice is compatible with the Nemo tenetur principle.78 Because
the “voluntary” character of this type of confession is questionable, the
legitimacy of this practice must be based on a conception of the Nemo
tenetur principle that is not grounded on the suspect giving the statement voluntarily.79
As a result, the continental practice of granting benefits for efficient collaboration, like the practice of granting immunity in exchange
for testimony in the United States, strengthens the argument against
voluntariness as the primary justification of the Nemo tenetur principle.
Neither practice can be reconciled with a right against self-incrimination
unless one adopts a conception of the Nemo tenetur principle that is divorced from the voluntariness of the confession.80

74 Id.
75 See Stephen C. Thaman, Plea-Bargaining, Negotiating Confession and Consensual Resolution of Criminal Cases, 11 Electronic J. Comp. L., Dec. 2007, at 1, 1–10, available at http://
www.ejcl.org/113/article113-34.pdf.
76 See, e.g., id. at 20–21. This is the case, for example, in Argentina, Spain, Italy, and
Germany. See id. at 38, 41; Farfán & Soledad, supra note 71, § 3.6.
77 See Farfán & Soledad, supra note 71, § 3.6.
78 See STC, May 25, 1987 (R.J., No. 75) (author trans.) (holding that the offer of sentence-mitigation in exchange for a suspect’s confession does not deprive a suspect of the
fundamental right not to confess involuntarily).
79 See Farfán & Soledad, supra note 71, § 3.6. See generally Godsey, supra note 1, at 473
(discussing the departure in U.S. case law from “the involuntary confession rule”).
80 Compare Farfán & Soledad, supra note 71, § 3.6 (noting that a reduction in punishment may cause a suspect to “waive” the rights afforded by the Nemo tenetur principle,
thereby lessening the voluntariness of his confession), with Godsey, supra note 1, at 473
(arguing that confessions should be inadmissible where they are compelled by imposing
objective penalties on a suspect in order to punish silence and provoke speech).
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B. The Difficulty of Identifying the Voluntariness of a Statement Without
Appealing to Normative Criteria
The second reason voluntariness should not be the primary justification for Nemo tenetur is that the definition of voluntary depends heavily on normative criteria.81 In the third book of Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle contends that an act must be considered voluntary if it is caused
by an agent’s desire.82 Aristotle suggests that a person acts voluntarily if
he agrees to commit a crime to spare the lives of his family because he
has the option of committing or not committing the offense.83 Ultimately, Aristotle argues, the cause of his act is not the coercion under
which he is placed, but his desire to save his family.84
The Aristotelian definition of voluntariness is at the core of criminal theory.85 Indeed, the Aristotelian concept of voluntariness can be
useful in some contexts.86 Nevertheless, it is broader than the notion of
“voluntariness” as it is used by courts and commentators when analyzing the Nemo tenetur principle.87 For example, an incriminating statement made under torture is voluntary in the Aristotelian sense because
the decision to incriminate oneself falls ultimately on the suspect.88
Such a confession, however, would not be considered voluntary under
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence today.89
The concept of voluntariness used in the court’s current jurisprudence is more similar to the analysis under the affirmative defense of
duress.90 Under that defense, an act carried out under coercion is gen81 See Godsey, supra note 1, at 468–69.
82 See Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics 55–56 ( J.A.K. Thomson trans., Penguin
Books 2004).
83 See id. at 50.
84 See id.
85 See Joseph D. Grano, Confessions, Truth, and the Law 61 (1993) (stating that
the “effort to distinguish voluntary from involuntary actions dates back at least to Aristotle”).
86 See id. at 61–62.
87 See, e.g., Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433–34; Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 285–86; Grano, supra
note 85, at 61–62 (“[F]or purposes of assessing blame and praise, we would find our standards . . . intolerably severe were voluntariness under Aristotle’s definition the only relevant consideration.”).
88 See Aristotle, supra note 82, at 50.
89 Compare id., with Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433–34 (summarizing the role of voluntariness
test in confession jurisprudence through the past century), and Fulminante, 499 U.S. at
285–86 (credible threat of violence resulted in a coerced confession in violation of defendant’s due process rights), and Grano, supra note 65, at 863 (documenting the “intolerable
uncertainty . . . of the due process voluntariness doctrine”).
90 See Model Penal Code § 2.09 (1985) (prescribing the affirmative defense of duress
only where the actor “engaged in criminal conduct because he was coerced to do so by the
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erally considered to be voluntary.91 However, if the defendant is able to
prove that his decision to succumb to the coercion was reasonable, he
will not be punished for that coerced wrongful act.92 This defense is
justified not because such acts are involuntary, but rather because society cannot fairly expect coerced actors to abstain from engaging in the
illegal act when a person of reasonable firmness would have done the
same.93 The defendant’s decision to succumb is analyzed under the
“person of reasonable firmness” test.94 Under this test, a court examines whether a person of reasonable firmness in a similar situation with
similar pressure would have abstained from engaging in a wrongful
act.95 If the court concludes that a person of reasonable firmness would
have resisted the pressure, then the defense does not apply.96
A more accurate definition of voluntary under the Nemo tenetur
principle would employ the same type of analysis. It would recognize
that threats of torture or other types of coercion, while not completely
obliterating the will, substantially reduce the subject’s ability to choose
freely whether to confess or not.97 The subject still has a choice (to confess or to be tortured), but these remaining options are not particularly
attractive.
This definition of voluntary, however, raises two questions. First,
how much must the suspect’s ability to choose be reduced so that his
act should be considered involuntary? Second, when are the remaining
courses of action so unattractive that the suspect’s decision to confess
should be considered involuntary?
Suppose a suspect has asserted his Fifth Amendment right not to
incriminate himself. The police, reasoning that continued interrogause or threat of unlawful force against himself or another, that a person of reasonable
firmness would have been unable to resist”).
91 See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.01 (1985) (prescribing that only unconscious body
movements or body movements that are the product of a reflex, convulsion, or hypnosis
ought to be considered “involuntary” for the purposes of criminal law). The Code suggests
acts committed under duress or coercion are voluntary. See id. Therefore, duress or coercion is only a defense to a crime if the defendant’s decision to succumb to the coercion is
reasonable. Id. § 2.09.
92 See id. § 2.09.
93 See id.
94 See id.
95 Id.; see also Luis E. Chiesa, Duress, Demanding Heroism, and Proportionality, 41 Vand. J.
Transnat’l L. 741, 753 (2008) (“Usually it would be unfair to punish someone for succumbing to a threat that a normal law-abiding citizen would have been unable to resist.”);
Dressler, supra note 15, at 1385 (explaining that if a “person of reasonable moral strength
cannot fairly be expected to resist the threat,” then the actor has a valid excuse).
96 See Dressler, supra note 15, at 1385.
97 See Grano, supra note 66, at 874–75.
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tion will be useless, tell the suspect that he must return to his cell. The
suspect, however, is terrified of his cramped and smelly cell and decides
to incriminate himself rather than return. Alternatively, suppose the
police, instead of merely ordering the suspect back to his cell, threaten
to torture him if he does not confess.
Should the suspect’s confession in either scenario be considered
voluntary? Was his choice so undermined by the fear of returning to his
cell or his fear of being tortured that his confession should be considered involuntary? Can his confession be considered voluntary when his
options (incriminating himself, being tortured, or returning to his cell)
are unattractive?
To determine if the suspect’s ability to choose has been sufficiently
reduced so as to render his act involuntary, one must compare his conduct with the conduct that a person of reasonable firmness would observe in his situation.98 Most people believe that confessions obtained
by torture are involuntary because a person of reasonable firmness
would confess under such treatment.99 In the second scenario, where
the police threaten to torture the suspect, the suspect’s ability to act
freely has been reduced to the point where his statement must be considered involuntary.100 A person of reasonable firmness would confess
in order to avoid being tortured.101 A similar analysis could be used to
determine if the suspect’s options were so unattractive that it must be
concluded that his choice was involuntary. Given that a person of reasonable firmness would not consider confessing to a crime or submitting to torture to be attractive options, the decision to confess under
these circumstances must be considered involuntary.102
In this way, the “person of reasonable firmness” standard is eminently normative in nature.103 The “voluntariness” of the act is not determined by the mental pressure experienced by the suspect.104 Rather
the “voluntariness” of the act is determined by examining whether the
subject’s choice-making capabilities were reduced in an unfair man98 See Model Penal Code § 2.09; Chiesa, supra note 95, at 761–62; Dressler, supra note
15, at 1367–68.
99 See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.09; Chiesa, supra note 95, at 761–62; Dressler, supra
note 15, at 1367–68.
100 See Chiesa, supra note 95, at 758.
101 See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.09; Chiesa, supra note 95, at 761–62; Dressler, supra
note 15, at 1367–68.
102 See Model Penal Code § 2.09; Chiesa, supra note 95, at 761–62; Dressler, supra note
15, at 1367–68.
103 See Schulhofer, supra note 65, at 874 n.41.
104 See id.
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ner.105 In the first scenario, where the police merely order the suspect
to return to his cell, the suspect’s confession should be considered voluntary. It should be admissible even if it is demonstrated that he felt
compelled to confess because of the mental pressure of returning to his
cell. To reject the statement simply because of the suspect’s perceived
mental pressure would lead to an overly subjective analysis. Confessions
made by a suspect must be considered involuntary and consequently
inadmissible only if the officers compromised the suspect’s voluntariness by using inappropriate methods as they did in the second scenario.106
As the above scenarios show, the Nemo tenetur principle should not
be primarily justified as a protection of a suspect’s “freedom” and
“spontaneity.” Rather, the admissibility of confessions should be determined by examining whether the government unfairly constrained the
suspect’s decision to confess rather than by inquiring into whether the
suspect freely chose to incriminate himself.
C. Voluntariness and Neuroscience
The third reason voluntariness should not be the primary justification for the Nemo tenetur principle is because recent developments in
neuroscience suggest that human behavior is most likely determined
almost entirely by factors outside an individual’s control.107 These discoveries further undermine the argument that the Nemo tenetur principle should be justified primarily as a protection of a suspect’s autonomy.
Forty years ago, the neurophysicist Benjamin Libet made an extraordinary discovery.108 According to his research, the brain unconsciously makes the decision to act almost half a second before a person
is aware of his desire or intent to carry out the act.109 These findings
have been corroborated many times, most recently in 2008.110 The im105 See generally Alan Wertheimer, Coercion 228–30, 307–10 (1987) (defending a
normative account of voluntariness and coercion).
106 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986); infra Part III.
107 Benjamin Libet et al., Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral
Activity (Readiness Potential): The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act, 106 Brain
623, 623–42 (1983).
108 See id.
109 See id.
110 See Laurence R. Tancredi, Hardwired Behavior: What Neuroscience Reveals
About Morality 71 (2005); Chun Siong Soon et al., Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain, 11 Nature Neuroscience 543, 543–45 (May 2008). Using functional MRI technology, Siong Soon and his colleagues were able to successfully predict the
bodily movements of their human subjects up to seven seconds before they were aware of
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plications of Libet’s experiments are monumental.111 If the intent to
move our body develops after the brain has unconsciously made the
decision to move it, it would appear that we do not have the ability to
control our acts.112 These findings suggest that while we may think we
consciously control our acts, in reality, our conduct is predetermined by
unconscious processes.113
According to some neuroscientists, this evidence suggests that our
free will “is an illusion.”114 Others have even suggested that the conscious will is nothing more than a mood, like happiness or sadness.115
If, according to the results of these experiments, the brain is faster than
conscious thought, “[i]t seems that it is not our conscious mind that
makes the decision, but instead the sub-conscious mind.”116 Philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas explained the impact that neuroscience has had and will continue to have over the debate about free
will in the following manner:
[Many] neuroscientists take the position that all mental acts
and experiences are not merely instantiated by brain processes but rather are causally determined by brain states alone.
If neurological research today already holds the key, as is
claimed, to soon explaining any given motivation or deliberation exclusively on the basis of the nomologically determined
interaction of neuronal processes, then we would have to view
free will as a fiction. For, from this perspective, we must no
longer presuppose that we could have acted differently, nor
that it was up to us to act one way rather than another. Indeed, within neurological descriptions, the reference to “us,”
as agents, no longer makes any sense. Human behavior is then
no longer decided by persons but rather fixed by their brains:
making the decision to move their bodies. See Brandon Keim, Brain Scanners Can See Your
Decisions Before You Make Them, Wired, Apr. 13, 2008, http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2008/04/mind_decision.
111 See Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to Responsibility from Neuroscience, 9 Minn. J. L. Sci. & Tech. 1, 28–29 (2008).
112 See id. at 29.
113 See Michael S. Gazzaniga, The Ethical Brain 92–93 (2005); Morse, supra note
111, at 29.
114 Gazzaniga, supra note 113, at 92–93. Renowned social psychologist Daniel Wegner
has reached a similar conclusion. See generally Daniel M. Wegner, The Illusion of Conscious Will 1–28 (2002) (discussing that the idea that we “consciously will our voluntary
actions” is merely an illusion).
115 Wegner, supra note 114, at 325–28.
116 Derek Sankey, Education Policy, Research and Neuroscience: The Final Solution?, 33 Australian J. Tchr. Educ., June 2008, at 31, 40.

2010]

Beyond Torture: The Nemo Tenetur Principle in Borderline Cases

55

“Who or what is this ‘we’ that inhabits the brain? It is a commentator and interpreter with limited access to the actual machinery, more along the lines of a press secretary than a
president or boss.”117
Some have interpreted Libet’s findings to be compatible with the
idea of free will.118 However, “nothing in the brain sciences would lead
an independent observer to conclude that we must be libertarian
agents.”119 Even those who assert that human beings have the ability to
act voluntarily acknowledge that “there are at present no accepted scientific models” that indicate that our acts can be consciously controlled.120 They also acknowledge that there is currently no empirical
evidence to suggest that our behavior is significantly determined by factors we can control.121 Perhaps even more compelling are the numerous studies showing that significant aspects of our behavior are deter-

117 Jürgen Habermas, The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will:
How Can Epistemic Dualism Be Reconciled with Ontological Monism?, 10 Phil. Explorations 13,
20 ( Joel Anderson trans., 2007) (quoting Daniel C. Dennett, Freedom Evolves 244
(2003)).
118 See, e.g., Dennett, supra note 117, at 227–42. Dennett, however, defends an “evolutionary” notion of free will that is very different from what is commonly understood by the
concept. Id. at 263. On the other hand, Libet has suggested that his findings can be compatible with the fact that human beings are able to avoid doing the act that the brain unconsciously determined should be done. See Benjamin Libet, Do We Have Free Will?, 6 J.
Consciousness Stud., No. 8–9 (1999), at 47, 51–53. In Libet’s own words:
The initiation of the freely voluntary act appears to begin in the brain unconsciously, well before the person consciously knows he wants to act! Is there,
then, any role for conscious will in the performance of a voluntary act? To answer this it must be recognized that conscious will [to act] . . . does appear
about 150 msec. before the muscle is activated, even though [the brain unconsciously ordered the muscle activation several hundred milliseconds before the subject became aware of it]. An interval of 150 msec. would allow
enough time in which the [subject’s] conscious function might affect the final outcome of the volitional process.
Id. at 51 (citation omitted). These statements suggest that it is possible that human beings
might be able to willingly avoid doing something, but not to decide positively to do something. See id. at 51–53. Thus, it may be contended that human beings have “free won’t”
instead of “free will.” See id.
119 Manuel Vargas, Response to Kane, Fischer, and Pereboom, in Four Views on Free Will
204, 206 (2007).
120 See, e.g., Robert Kane, Response to Fischer, Pereboom, and Vargas, in Four Views on
Free Will, supra note 119, at 166, 181 (quoting Manuel Vargas, Revisionism, in Four Views
on Free Will, supra note 119, at 126, 143).
121 Id.
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mined by genetic and environmental factors outside of our control.122
The results of this research “[are] forcing us to rethink the extent of
our personal control over our choices.”123
This evidence, which suggests that our acts are not determined by
our conscious will, threatens to undermine any argument which seeks
to justify the Nemo tenetur principle primarily as a protection of a suspect’s autonomy.124 After all, why should we believe that such a fundamental right exists to protect a mental faculty whose existence is debated?125 Because considerable evidence shows we may not be able to
control our acts (including illocutionary acts), we should justify the
Nemo tenetur principle by appealing to considerations that go beyond
the “voluntariness” or “involuntariness” of the statement.126
III. Beyond Trustworthiness and Voluntariness
Parts I and II argued that it is undesirable to conceive the Nemo tenetur principle as a guarantee against untrustworthy or involuntary statements. Consequently, the principle should be justified primarily as a
safeguard against the use of inappropriate interrogation techniques.127
Justifying the Nemo tenetur principle primarily as a protection against inappropriate interrogation techniques, however, does not mean that the
trustworthiness or voluntariness of a statement will not be taken into
account.
Sometimes an untrustworthy confession is inadmissible pursuant
to the Nemo tenetur principle.128 An untrustworthy confession, however,
can be obtained in a manner compatible with the Nemo tenetur principle.129 Conversely, a trustworthy statement can be obtained through
coercion or torture, and thus be incompatible with the suspect’s right
to be free from coerced interrogation.130
122 See Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate, 41 Div. One Gen. Psychologist, Spring 2006, at
1, 3–4 (2006) (discussing various studies on the way in which genetics and the environment affect our behavior).
123 Tancredi, supra note 110, at 75.
124 See id. at 75–76.
125 See Gazzaniga, supra note 113, at 95, 100–01.
126 See, e.g., id.; Wegner, supra note 114, at 26–27; Soon et al., supra note 110, at 545.
127 See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 843 n.33 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Traynor, supra note 7, at 478); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1963).
128 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936); Hector v. State, 2 Mo. 167, 168
(1829).
129 See, e.g., Gudjonsson, supra note 36, at 227–29 (discussing voluntary false confessions).
130 See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320–21 (1959).
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It is also possible that a confession obtained in violation of the suspect’s right not to incriminate himself was secured under circumstances
that would make the confession involuntary.131 Confessions obtained by
torture, for example, are usually considered to be involuntary.132 Yet,
conceiving the Nemo tenetur principle as a vehicle for guaranteeing the
voluntariness of a suspect’s decision to confess presents three different
problems. First, suspects in almost every legal system can be compelled
to confess in a way that calls into question the voluntariness of the confession.133 Second, making the admissibility of a statement hinge upon
its voluntary character is also objectionable, since the definition of voluntariness or involuntariness depends on normative criteria.134 Third,
recent scientific research suggests humans do not possess the ability to
voluntarily control their acts.135 As a result, the Nemo tenetur principle
should be justified by considerations unrelated to the trustworthiness
or voluntariness of the confession.136
A. The Nemo Tenetur Principle as a Protection Against Improper Governmental
Conduct
The Nemo tenetur principle should be understood as a guarantee
against the state’s use of improper or abusive interrogation techniques.
The right, however, cannot be invoked against private persons in the
vast majority of jurisdictions.137 For example, the protection against self131 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 n.53 (1972) (“A coerced confession
is as revealing of leads as testimony given in exchange for immunity and indeed is excluded in part because it is compelled incrimination in violation of the privilege.”) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 103 (1964) (White, J. concurring)).
132 Gudjonsson, supra note 36, at 284.
133 See supra notes 66–80 and accompanying text.
134 See supra notes 81–106 and accompanying text.
135 See, e.g., Libet et al., supra note 107, at 640; Soon et al., supra note 110, at 545.
136 See Spano, 360 U.S. at 324 (holding that the accurate confession by the defendant
obtained through coercion was violative of his Fourteenth Amendment rights); Dix, supra
note 35, at 275 (stating that whether coercive techniques by police officers pose threats to
reliability may be impossible to “address with any certainty”).
137 See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (“[C]oercive police activity
is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Wigfall v. State, 710 So. 2d
931, 937 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (“So long as law enforcement officers do not incite or
coach family members to elicit a confession from the accused, the fact that a defendant
elects to confess after conferring with family members does not render a confession involuntary.”); Mirabal v. State, 698 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that an
involuntary confession to private employers cannot taint a second confession to police
after defendant waived his rights); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 899 S.W.2d 75, 75–76 (Ky.
1995) (holding that coercive conduct by a private citizen does not render a confession
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incrimination does not require that our friends advise us of our right to
remain silent before asking potentially incriminating questions.138
Therefore, if someone answers incriminating questions posed by a private person, the statements are admissible against him, regardless of
how those answers were obtained.139 Conversely, if the police torture a
suspect to obtain a confession, that confession should be deemed inadmissible.140 The crucial factor that differentiates these two cases is
not the relative voluntariness or trustworthiness of the statements, but
the presence or absence of inappropriate police conduct.141
B. Identifying Improper Methods of Interrogation
Once the Nemo tenetur principle is conceived as a protection against
the use of unacceptable methods of interrogation to obtain incriminating statements, it becomes necessary to provide a framework that helps
us to identify improper or abusive interrogation techniques. Such a
framework is necessary to provide a concrete conceptual structure that

involuntary and therefore inadmissible under state law); Hough v. State, 929 S.W.2d 484
(Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a confession was voluntary, despite the defendant’s
estranged wife telling him that she would reconcile with him). But see State v. Bowe, 881
P.2d 538, 546 (Haw. 1994) (“[A]n individual’s capacity to make a rational and free choice
between confessing and remaining silent may be overborne as much by the coercive conduct of a private individual as by the coercive conduct of the police. . . . Therefore . . . admitting coerced confessions regardless of the source of the coercion, is fundamentally
unfair.”); State v. Martin, 645 So. 2d 752, 754 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (“[T]his state statute
mandates that all confessions, regardless of whether a state actor was involved, must be
voluntary.”); Commonwealth v. Brandwein, 760 N.E.2d 724, 732 n.10 (Mass. 2002)
(“[C]oercion by a private party may render a defendant’s confession to that private party
involuntary, requiring that the confession be suppressed as violative of due process.”);
Commonwealth v. Smith, 686 N.E.2d 983, 989 (Mass. 1997) (holding that, in a murder
prosecution, the defendant’s confessions made to his sister and brother were admissible,
where the “judge correctly instructed [the] jury to disregard statements to family members
unless they concluded for themselves that the Commonwealth had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements were voluntary”); People v. Sorbo, 649 N.Y.S.2d 318, 319
(Sup. Ct. 1996) (“[F]ruits of statements made involuntarily to private parties are subject to
suppression.”).
138 See Wigfall, 710 So. 2d at 937 (“So long as law enforcement officers do not incite or
coach family members to elicit a confession from the accused, the fact that a defendant
elects to confess after conferring with family members does not render a confession involuntary.”).
139 See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165.
140 See id. at 164.
141 See id. at 167 (holding that “coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,” and hence a confession coerced by a private citizen is voluntary).
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will assist judges in discriminating between acceptable and unacceptable methods of interrogation in borderline cases.142
This Part provides such a framework by arguing that the police act
improperly when they obtain a confession by methods that involve the
use of coercion, certain kinds of deception, exploitation or the transgression
of a mutually agreed upon rule with the purpose of obtaining an unfair
advantage over the suspect.
1. Coercion
The government acts inappropriately if it coerces the suspect to
confess by threatening to use physical force against him.143 This is the
core of the Fifth Amendment’s due process protection against forced
confessions. Coerced confessions must be considered inadmissible regardless of their trustworthiness and voluntariness.144 A confession
made under threat of torture must not be admitted as evidence even if
there are techniques that allow the state to successfully ascertain the
statement’s trustworthiness. By the same token, forced confessions
should not be admitted into evidence even if the subject conclusively
demonstrates that the police coercion did not influence his decision to
confess.145
It is also inappropriate to try to compel the suspect to confess by
threatening to cause him psychological pain.146 Examples of psycho-

142 See Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court’s Voluntariness Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 Wash. U. L.Q. 59, 116–17 (1989).
[Miranda’s] most serious flaw, however, lay in the fact that it was a value-laden
method of constitutional adjudication that created vague, unpredictable standards which failed to provide clear guidance to police and made judicial review
a morass of subjectivity. The Court itself openly complained of the difficulties in
drawing the line between an acceptable police tactic and a violation of due
process particularly when the Court must make “fine judgments as to the effect
of psychologically coercive pressures and inducements on the mind and will of
the accused.”
Id. (quoting Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963)) (citing Schulhofer, supra
note 65, at 869–70) (discussing difficulties for courts and police posed by due process involuntary confession rule).
143 See U.S. Const. amend. V; Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 349–50 (2006)
(“We require exclusion of coerced confessions . . . because we disapprove of such coercion
. . . .”); Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347 (1981).
144 See Wigmore, supra note 11, § 824; McCormick, supra note 40, at 268–69; White, supra note 8, at 117.
145 See Kamisar, supra note 65, at 24.
146 See Gudjonsson, supra note 36, at 316.
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logical pain may include a threat to take away a suspect’s custody over
his children or his property if he fails to incriminate himself.147
In general, coercion occurs when the police obtain a confession by
threatening to commit an illegal act.148 Conversely, a confession is usually admissible if the suspect is compelled to testify against himself with
a threat by the police to commit a legal act.149 Suppose, for example,
that a police officer asks a car driver if he has ingested alcoholic beverages in the past few hours. The driver refuses to answer, and the officer
threatens to administer an alcohol test if the driver refuses again. If it is
legal to administer an alcohol test, it is not inappropriate for the officer
to threaten the driver with performing the test.150
2. Deception
Police can also act inappropriately by using certain kinds of deception to obtain a confession.151 Not all kinds of deception, however, are
equally wrongful. Obtaining a confession by lying to the suspect and
obtaining a confession by misleading the suspect are different.152
As a general rule, it is more blameworthy to lie than to mislead by
asserting something that is not false.153 Federal criminal law reflects the
different culpability of these two types of deception.154 For example, a
witness is guilty of perjury if he lies under oath.155 Lying is defined as
asserting something the witness believes to be false.156 A witness, however, does not commit perjury if he misleads others by asserting something true or not capable of being true or false.157

147 See id.
148 See id. at 206.
149 See id.
150 See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 562 (1983) (holding that the admission
into evidence of the defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test does not offend
his privilege against self-incrimination because no impermissible coercion is involved when
the suspect refuses to submit to take the test, regardless of the form of refusal).
151 See White, supra note 8, at 118–19.
152 See Green, supra note 16, at 77–78.
153 See id. at 78.
154 See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006).
155 See id.
156 See Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 357 (1973).
157 See id. at 357–58 (stating that perjury statutes do “not [deal] with casual conversation and the [perjury] statute does not make it a criminal act for a witness to willfully state
any material matter that implies any material matter that he does not believe to be true”).
In sum, the Supreme Court expressly held in Bronston that the federal perjury statute prohibits lying under oath, but not misleading under oath. See id.
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The distinction is morally relevant in non-legal contexts. In the
most recent presidential campaign, supporters of John McCain asserted
that Barack Obama’s middle name was “Hussein.”158 They also pointed
out that this is a common name in the Muslim world.159 Both assertions
are true.160 The purpose of the assertion, however, was to mislead the
public into believing that Obama is Muslim and it is objectionable, although it would be much more blameworthy to falsely assert that
“Obama is Muslim.” The difference between lying and misleading
should be taken into account when determining if an inappropriate
deception was used to obtain a confession.161 Lying in order to obtain a
statement must always be considered inappropriate.162 Nevertheless,
misleading a suspect by asserting something that is not false is not necessarily unacceptable.163 For example, a police officer acts in an unacceptable manner if he tells a suspect that it is better for him to confess,
since DNA tests reveal that he raped the victim when the officer knows
there are no such tests.164 The officer, however, may try to induce a confession through other methods. For example, he could tell the suspect
correctly, though with the intent to mislead, that the police officer is
about to receive a DNA test that he believes will implicate the suspect in
a rape.165 Although the purpose of the latter assertion is to mislead the
suspect into a belief that DNA tests will confirm his guilt, the suspect
cannot rationally conclude this statement is true unless he also believes
the DNA test will implicate him in the rape.166 If the suspect makes the
wrong inference without gathering additional information to clarify the
situation, the police officer is not entirely responsible for the suspect’s
confession.167 If it seems reasonable that individuals should be held ac158 See Foon Rhee, Biden Calls Latest Attacks on Obama Dangerous, Says McCain Campaign
Is Inciting Anger, Boston Globe, Oct. 9, 2008, at 18.
159 See id.
160 See id.
161 See Green, supra note 16, at 78–79.
162 See id.
163 See id. at 77–78.; White, supra note 8, at 118–19.
164 See Green, supra note 16, at 77.
165 See id. at 78–79.
166 See White, supra note 8, at 132.
167 See id. Surprisingly, scholars have failed to grasp the significance of the lying/misleading distinction in the context of the admissibility of confessions. Professor White, for
example, has argued that obtaining confessions by employing “certain types of trickery”
should be banned. See id. at 135. Although Professor White’s suggestion that officers should
not make false statements about the evidence they have against the defendant is sensible, he
glossed over the important difference between lying to the defendant about the evidence
against him and misleading him into believing that strong evidence exists against him. See id.
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countable for the consequences of their bad acts, why shouldn’t they
also be held accountable for the consequences of their bad inferences?168
3. Exploitation
The police also act inappropriately when they exploit a subject’s
physical or mental condition or character traits with the aim of obtaining a confession. A suspect is exploited when he is used for someone
else’s benefit in a way that is detrimental to his own well-being.169 The
exploitation of a person can occur in many ways. It is possible, for example, to exploit a suspect’s weaknesses.170 It is also possible to exploit a
suspect’s strengths.171 Sometimes what is exploited is a suspect’s particular circumstances.172 These traits or circumstances can be exploited by
promises, flattery, or requests.173 A suspect can also be exploited by appeals to his sense of friendship, compassion, or a religious, ethical, or
legal duty.174
Sometimes it is not clear that the exploitation of the suspect is
morally wrong. For example, it is not obviously unacceptable to use a
person’s sense of friendship or compassion to get something.175 In
some contexts, however, it may be inappropriate to exploit these feelings.176 For instance, in Spano, an officer who was a good friend of the
suspect told the suspect that he would lose his job with the police if he
failed to secure a confession.177 The Supreme Court condemned this
type of behavior.178 It suggested, however, that the exploitation of the
subject’s sense of friendship and compassion did not necessarily entail
the inadmissibility of the confession.179 Rather, it stated that the totality
at 132. Whereas the former conduct is clearly inappropriate, it is unclear whether the latter
type of conduct ought to lead to the inadmissibility of the confession thus obtained. See id.
168 See Jonathan E. Adler, Lying, Deceiving, or Falsely Implicating, 94 J. Phil. 435, 444
(1997) (arguing that deception, rather than lies, involve the hearer’s responsibility and
mistaken inferences).
169 See generally 4 Joel Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing 176–78 (1988).
170 See id. at 181–82.
171 See id. at 181; Vittorio Bufacchi, The Injustice of Exploitation, 5 Critical Rev. Int’l
Soc. & Pol. Phil. 1, 2 (2002).
172 See Green, supra note 16, at 95.
173 See Feinberg, supra note 169, at 181.
174 See id.
175 See Green, supra note 16, at 96–97.
176 See Spano, 360 U.S. at 323.
177 See id.
178 See id. at 323–24.
179 See id. at 323.
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of the circumstances surrounding the statement must be analyzed in
order to determine if the officer’s conduct was sufficiently blameworthy
so as to make the confession inadmissible.180 Exploiting a suspect by
appealing to his sense of friendship and compassion is just one of the
factors considered in the analysis.181 Ultimately, the exploitation of such
character traits should be considered relevant but not determinative
when examining whether the police obtained a confession in a manner
that is incompatible with the Nemo tenetur principle.182
Certain types of exploitation, however, are clearly unacceptable.
Take, for example, a shop-owner who drastically increases the price of
basic goods after a natural disaster. The shop owner’s behavior is unacceptable because he is purposely taking advantage of his customers’
vulnerable position. This kind of exploitation becomes even more unacceptable when the person who takes advantage of the situation has
intentionally caused the other’s defenselessness.183 Interrogating a suspect who is under police custody is an example of this type of exploitation.184 In these situations, the government purposely reduces the suspect to a state of powerlessness in order to obtain a confession by
exploiting the suspect’s acute vulnerability.185
Imagine a suspect newly in police custody. At first glance, it would
seem that a suspect in police custody has not been placed in a position
of great helplessness. When, however, it is taken into account that the
suspect’s basic needs and freedoms are entirely at the mercy of the police, the suspect’s profound vulnerability becomes apparent.186 The
person in custody cannot move without police permission, and he has
no power to interrupt the interrogation to use the bathroom, smoke a
cigarette, or grab a bite to eat. If the interrogation room is too cold, the
suspect can only wait for the police to decide to turn on the heat or
give him a blanket. The police, in sum, have almost total control over
the person in custody.187 Therefore, it seems wrong for the police to try
to obtain a confession by exploiting the defenselessness of the suspect.188
180 See id.
181 See Spano, 360 U.S. at 323.
182 See Feinberg, supra note 177, at 176–77.
183 See Green, supra note 16, at 96–97.
184 See Spano, 360 U.S. at 323.
185 See id.
186 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966)
187 See id.
188 See id.
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The police may nevertheless remedy the situation by advising the
suspect of his constitutional right to remain silent and, more importantly, his right to counsel during the interrogation.189 After the suspect
has been advised that the police have to provide him with an attorney
during the interrogation to defend him, the suspect no longer has reason to believe that he is utterly defenseless.190
4. Transgression
The Supreme Court has ruled that after the formal commencement of criminal proceedings against a defendant, the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel bars the State from deliberately eliciting incriminating statements from the defendant unless his lawyer is
present.191 The right to counsel afforded by the Sixth Amendment in
such circumstances differs from the protections afforded to suspects
pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona because it is triggered regardless of
whether the suspect is being subjected to custodial interrogation.192
Therefore, it cannot be argued that the purpose of affording defendants with a Sixth Amendment right to counsel during police interrogations is to avoid the exploitation of the state of vulnerability caused by
police custody. Furthermore, it cannot be maintained that the chief objective of this right is to protect the suspect against the use of coercion
or deception.193 What, then, is the evil sought to be avoided by this safeguard?
It is submitted that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel during
police interrogations prevents the State from transgressing a mutually
189 See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
190 See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; Grano, supra note 88, at 145. The late Professor
Joseph Grano suggested that the protections afforded as a result of Miranda v. Arizona
should be understood as safeguards to guarantee that confessions are obtained in a noncoercive manner. See Grano, supra note 88, at 173–74. Grano further concluded that
Miranda is problematic because, in his view, it could inadvertently bar confessions that
were obtained without coercion. See id. at 202. Indeed, under Miranda, confessions obtained without coercion can be excluded. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457. Grano, however,
failed to consider that Miranda seeks to prevent confessions obtained through exploitation, not just coercion. See id.; Grano, supra note 88, at 195. Once Miranda is conceived as
a case that seeks to prevent the coercion and exploitation of suspects, Professor Grano’s
argument to overrule Miranda loses much of its persuasive force. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at
477; Grano, supra note 88, at 195. After all, exploiting the suspect can sometimes be as
wrongful as coercing him. See Part III.
191 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 201, 207 (1964) (holding that incriminating
statements surreptitiously obtained from the defendant by the government after initiation
of criminal proceedings and without the defendant’s attorney present were inadmissible).
192 See Grano, supra note 88, at 145.
193 See supra notes 143–174 and accompanying text.
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agreed upon rule in order to obtain an undue advantage over the suspect.194 Given the complexity of the criminal justice system, those in
charge of litigating a criminal case are not the parties (the defendant
and the People), but their attorneys (defense attorney and prosecutor).
Therefore, once criminal proceedings have commenced, it is understood that the State must communicate with the defendant through his
legal representative.195 Only then can the defendant’s rights be protected, since his ignorance of the complexities of the criminal justice
system could cause him to inadequately manage his case without the
steady hand of his defense counsel.196
This mutually agreed upon rule between the suspect and the State
is transgressed when the police interrogate the suspect without his lawyer after the criminal process has formally begun.197 The conduct is
inappropriate because with this transgression, the police have bypassed
one of the foundational rules that undergird our criminal justice system in order to obtain an undue advantage over the suspect.198 When
this happens, the State has essentially “cheated” by violating a basic rule
of the legal system in order to prevail over the defendant.199
Conclusion
This Article began by describing three borderline cases in which it
was not clear whether a confession had been obtained in violation of
the Nemo tenetur principle. The case of the false confession presented a
situation in which a suspect made a voluntary confession but where
overwhelming evidence suggested that confession was false. In contrast,
the confession obtained in the case of the truth serum was highly trustworthy but arguably not voluntary, given that it was induced by a drug.
Lastly, in the case of the unnecessary threat, the police physically threatened the suspect if she refused to confess. The suspect, however, indicated in a judicial hearing that the threat did not influence her decision to confess.
In order to provide solutions for these three borderline cases, this
Article argued that the Nemo tenetur principle should be understood as a
safeguard against the use of unacceptable methods of police interroga194 See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444–45; Massiah, 377 U.S. at 207
(White, J. dissenting); Green, supra note 16, at 58, 63, 66.
195 See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Massiah, 377 U.S. at 205–07.
196 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444–45.
197 See Green, supra note 16, at 58.
198 See id. at 58, 63, 66.
199 See id.
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tion. The trustworthiness or voluntariness of the statement may be important in other contexts, but they should not definitively determine
the admissibility of a confession pursuant to the Nemo tenetur principle.
This conception of the Nemo tenetur principle suggests that the
statement in the false confession case was secured in a manner that is
compatible with the suspect’s constitutional rights and thus would be
admissible as evidence of his guilt. That, of course, does not mean that
the confession must necessarily be admitted into evidence. In many jurisdictions there are rules that are designed primarily to protect against
the admission of evidence with questionable probative value.200
Similarly, this conception of the Nemo tenetur principle suggests that
the confession in the truth serum case also did not violate the suspect’s
right against self-incrimination and is, therefore, also admissible. In this
example, the police had no reason to know the suspect was under the
influence of a truth serum, so there is no question of whether they used
unacceptable methods of interrogation to obtain the confession. If the
police had administered the drug in order to obtain a confession or if
they had reason to know that the subject was under the effects of the
drug, then the analysis would be different.201
Finally, it seems that the confession secured in the unnecessary threat
case was obtained in a manner incompatible with the Nemo tenetur principle. Despite the fact that the suspect’s statement in this case was entirely voluntary and highly trustworthy, the interrogation techniques
used by the police to obtain the confession were repugnant. This alone
should be enough to justify not admitting the confession into evidence.
The difficulty of explaining this conclusion by appealing to the confession’s voluntariness or trustworthiness counts as a powerful reason in
favor of understanding the Nemo tenetur principle as a safeguard against
the use of inappropriate methods of interrogation rather than as a
mechanism for securing the reliability or voluntariness of confessions.

200 See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 111–13 (1934) (holding that the State’s use
of testimony known by prosecuting authorities to be false is a denial of due process).
201 See supra Part III (explaining that the purposeful exploitation of a helpless suspect
is improper and must be barred under the Nemo tenetur principle).

